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Solving the collective action problem:




	History will remember 2020 as the year that the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic ravaged the world.  The year began with the news that an unknown flu virus with pneumonia-like symptoms first appeared in China is spreading to other parts of the world.  By the middle of 2020, this invisible ‘enemy’ managed to wreak social, economic, and political havoc across the world.  Different governments – whether democracies or non-democracies – responded variedly as the coronavirus infection spread throughout their country. 

Many governments were scrambling to enact economic support and stimulus legislation to prevent the caving in of their economies as economic activity came to a drastic slowdown that saw spikes in business failures and unemployment.  Public health systems came under increasing strain as the COVID-19 virus infection rate spread throughout communities and the high mortality rates inundating the hospital systems.  While the COVID-19 virus is still spreading, as of the writing of this study, using current infection rates as well as mortality rates, initial assessments can lead us to infer that there are some countries that have managed the pandemic better than others.  This assessment holds true for countries classified as democracies where government and public health responses vary. 

The coronavirus pandemic arrived at a challenging time for contemporary democracies.  In the first two decades of the 21st century, liberal democracy as a way of organizing politics and governance is increasingly being challenged and confronted from both within and without.  Internally, modern democracies are witnessing the upsurge of populism, extremism, and illiberal politics that is undermining political trust and contributing to fragmentation and polarization.  Externally, some illiberal political systems are successfully ‘delivering the goodies’ – such as good living standards, good public safety, etc. – while many democracies are underperforming leading some to question the value of democratic regimes. 

Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, economic performance of democracies was coming under intense scrutiny as economic globalization and the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has resulted in the uneven benefits of market economies to their citizens exacerbating existing inequities in wealth distribution.  In addition, China’s economic emergence and its success in lifting a significant proportion of its population out of poverty have presented an alternative authoritarian model of economic development – state capitalism.  China’s state capitalism model with its decoupling of authoritarian, restrictive, and illiberal politics with market economics seem to suggest that citizens are willing to trade-off individual liberties and civil rights for guarantees of material gains in economic well-being.  This model contrasts sharply with the coupling of the political freedom and economic freedom that is the predominant paradigm in the advanced industrial democracies.   

The China model’s economic challenge led normally reticent market-oriented democratic governments to find ‘political’ solutions to largely economic problems.  In moves away from the neoliberalism of the 1980s, democratic governments have increasingly use market intervention policies, implement protectionist measures, and adopt inward-looking economic policies.  

The political solutions to economic problems resulting from globalization have seen the rise of populism, illiberalism, and extreme right parties in Western democracies.  These ushered in polarized politics such as America First and Brexit that seem to weaken the postwar political consensus and brought about conflictual politics.  For example, the messy process that was Brexit that began in 2016, for some, is clear evidence of the inefficiency and malaise of democratic political decision-making.  In sum, the first two decades of the 21st century have been extremely challenging and are certainly not stellar examples of fine democratic performance.

In the midst of all this, the COVID-19 pandemic swept through the world testing the disaster response preparedness of democracies and non-democracies alike.  China, as the first country hit by the coronavirus, went hard and initiated total lockdowns of cities and provinces in an effort to get the community transmission of the virus under control.  Italy and Spain struggled in their initial public health responses as their public health systems were overwhelmed with the two countries registering high number of infections and deaths.  The United Kingdom and the United States were soon hit by the COVID-19 virus and struggled to get the community transmission under control.  While China came out of lockdown by June 2020, the United States is still unable to control the spread of the virus and has become the country with the largest number of infections and deaths.  

The poor disaster responses of prominent democracies, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, led to alternative narratives questioning the efficacy of democratic governments and quick to praise the pandemic control of non-democracies and illiberal countries such as China, Vietnam, and Singapore.  Yet, while some democracies are failing in the task of controlling the pandemic, there are many others that are considered ‘success’ stories such as Germany, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, and New Zealand.  

In this paper, I concentrate on two states – Taiwan and New Zealand – that have been globally recognized as ‘star’ performers in the COVID-19 pandemic response.  Taiwan, despite its proximity to the origin of the coronavirus, has managed to keep its community infection rate and deaths extremely low without the need for a complete nationwide lockdown.  New Zealand instituted a five-week nationwide lockdown but like Taiwan also managed to keep COVID-19 under control with low community infection rates and low death rates (with 22 at time of writing).  Both Taiwan and New Zealand continue to adroitly keep the COVID-19 virus at bay.​[1]​ 

So, how have two island nations able to manage the COVID-19 crisis while others have done poorly?  In this paper, I argue that the adroit pandemic crisis response and management of Taiwan and New Zealand can be attributed to two critical factors – political leadership and political communication.  In the next section, I offer a theoretical framework borrowed from studies of issue and problem definition in agenda-setting and public suggesting that leadership’s ability to move and control the rhetoric by contracting the issue space and its effective communication of the preferred narrative are significant factors in these two countries’ effective pandemic response.​[2]​  Following this theoretical section, I briefly discuss the comparative method used in this study and provide a background of the pandemic responses of Taiwan and New Zealand.  In the third section, I provide the empirical evidence of how political leadership and political communication are the critical factors in explaining the ‘success’ of these two democracies as a ‘test’ of theory of issue contraction.  In the final section, I conclude by suggesting – that once confounding factors have been controlled – regime type (i.e., democracy versus non-democracy) as an explanatory factor for ‘good’ pandemic response is a false positive.  That using the most different system design (MDS), the Taiwan and New Zealand comparison tells us that political leadership and political communication are significant explanatory factors that helped us understand why these two countries have managed to keep the COVID-19 virus at bay.


To Expand or to Contract: that is the question

	As China and other illiberal regimes are beginning to show signs of controlling the spread of the COVID-19 virus, Europe and North America were in the ‘thick of the fight’ and struggling to control the coronavirus pandemic.  News from Italy and Spain reported rapid community virus infection that quickly overwhelmed their health care systems and saw huge death rates.  By the time, the United Kingdom and the United States began their own struggle in controlling the coronavirus, narratives about how illiberal regimes are better able to control the pandemic vis-à-vis liberal democratic regimes were taking root.  Though at face value, there seem to be some validity to this suggestion, it fails to hold up under stricter empirical test.  One obvious and glaring question that has never been asked is the following: If the unknown coronavirus began in a democratic regime (instead of a non-democratic regime), will a pandemic have occurred in the first place? 
 
	While this is a hypothetical question with innumerable assumptions, one clue to this question lies on the nature of information in different types of regimes.  One important feature and strength of democracy is in the relative symmetry of information in society.  Like a perfectly competitive market of the neoclassical economic model or the efficient market theory proposed by financial economists, information flow in democratic societies is relatively open and readily available, at least vis-à-vis non-democracies.  In this instance, it is reasonably likely that in democratic regime information about the coronavirus will be more readily available and more quickly disseminated to the public rather than not.  

	In the public sphere, information is a precious commodity.  Information can be used to support and reinforce dominant perspectives or it can be employed as counter-information to weaken an existing perspective.  In the political arena, political elites (in democracies or non-democracies) understand the value of this information ‘commodity.’  In non-democracies, the political value of this commodity is such that it is less free flowing, less readily available, and much more controlled in favor of a small group of oligarchs.  In contrast, in democracies the information market is less controlled and more readily available.  But while information flow and information availability are strengths of democracies, these can be double-edge swords as well.  As much as information can be used to consolidate preferred perspectives and narratives, the same information can also generate alternative narratives that can undermine the dominant paradigm.  In an era of huge advances in information and communication technologies, the proliferation of information sources and availability of information are both a blessing and a bane.

It is in the context of the contestation of narrative and rhetoric in the public sphere or the political market that political actors in democracies must operate under.  In democracies, agendas and policies are publicly debated and conducted in the public sphere (e.g., parliamentary debates, media, etc.).  Both proponents and opponents of proposed policies attempt to define issues that give them an upper-hand in agenda-setting.  Studies of issue/problem definition in agenda-setting and public policy fit four major themes – causality,​[3]​ overall image of the problem,​[4]​ the solution to the problem identified,​[5]​ and actors defining the problem.​[6]​  While Rochefort and Cobb rightly points that there are still gaps in our understanding of problem definition in agenda-setting and public policy, they also acknowledge that this situation simply reflects how policy processes and policy issues are inherently fluid.​[7]​

In this context, scholars have long noted that the “use of language is critical in determining which aspect of a problem will be examined.  Rhetoric can help lodge a particular understanding of a problem in the minds of the public and protagonists.”​[8]​  As Baumgartner suggests,

“Policymakers behave like the navigators of a hot air balloon.  They seek to steer their policies to those areas in the political and administrative system where the winds are most favorable to them…In the case of policymaking, important conflicts often rage over the proper definition of the issue, with one side arguing that the issue has broad political implications and another saying that it concerns only a narrow range of technical specialists.”​[9]​

Control of the issue definition affects the size and number of participants as well as the arena where this tug-of-war is occurring.  Consequently, it can significantly affect the chances of a policy being adopted or not.  As E.E. Schattschneider reminds us in his classic work, The Semi-Sovereign People, “conflicts are frequently won or lost by the success that the contestants have in getting the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it, as the case may be.”​[10]​ Realizing this, policymakers are keen to navigate an issue to an arena where they believe they are better placed to ‘managing’ the narrative and thereby increasing their ‘winning’ chances.

	The question, then, is what arena serves policymakers best?  Like most questions in political science the answer is: “It depends.”  Depending on the nature of the issue in contention and the issue subject, the arena can be political, bureaucratic, or technocratic.  As Baumgartner avers, 

“Generally speaking, politicians become involved in political questions, and civil servants and other experts decide technical ones.  The definition of what is political and what is technical, however, is anything but straightforward.”​[11]​

Since the definition of what is political and technical is not straightforward, as Baumgartner suggests, politics and policy entrepreneurs have roles to play.  In terms of defining the issue, policy entrepreneurs use two general strategies – issue contraction versus issue expansion. According to Schattschneider, “winning groups try to restrict participation in a policy issue by limiting the scope of the conflict whereas losing groups try to widen participation in a policy issue.”​[12]​ These conclusions are strengthened by a wide array of literature and supported by longitudinal studies that provided valuable insights on the dynamics of problem definition and political attention.​[13]​

Each of these two strategies determines the arena or policy venues, the critical actors and players, and the narrative and rhetoric that become part of the policy contestation.​[14]​  In general, “contractors use the most arcane and incomprehensible technical vocabulary possible so that non-experts cannot even understand the issues being discussed.  Expanders portray the issue as broad and political so that a broader range of actors can take part.”​[15]​  As Guiraudon suggests, “depending on…policy venues…where authoritative decisions are made concerning a given issue, different constituencies will be mobilized.  The rules that guide each political arena favor different kinds of actors as they require different resources and call for different strategies.”​[16]​  Proponents and opponents, then, will steer the issue to the arena that they believe is most advantageous to them.   

Applying this theoretical framework of issue contraction and expansion to our examination of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis of Taiwan and New Zealand allows us to highlight the role that political leadership and political communication played in the control of the issue definition and issue narratives.  I put forward the argument that in terms of this pandemic response, the political leadership (and of course being policy entrepreneurs) identified the issue as mainly in the realm of public health and defined it as such.  The political leadership of Taiwan and New Zealand actively navigated the pandemic response policy to the technocratic and technical arena.  They narrowed the scope of participants in the policy arena to technocrats (e.g., epidemiologists, disease and infection specialists, medical specialists, etc.) and key political leaders with specialist backgrounds.  By controlling the dominant rhetoric and narrative, the leadership of the two countries ably managed the political communication arena and successfully adopted and implemented the public health response with stellar results.

In the next section, I provide a brief discussion of the methodology and the two cases – Taiwan and New Zealand – as a background of their pandemic response.

A Comparative Background of Taiwan and New Zealand 

	To help us examine this, I employ the most different system design as suggested by Przeworski and Teune where we attempt to show the robustness of the relationship between two factors by showing its validity across different settings.​[17]​  Using this most different system design, “we seek to test a relationship by discovering whether it can be observed in a range of countries with contrasting histories, cultures, and so on.”​[18]​  Taiwan and New Zealand present an interesting comparative study of the pandemic response.  In applying the most different system design to a comparison of Taiwan and New Zealand we are immediately drawn to the fact that above and beyond the similar ‘success’ in the containment of the COVID-19 virus, both countries are not exactly similarly situated. 

The democratic island state of Taiwan is a contested polity as China claims it as its own territory and China aggressively pushes its one-China principle on other nation-states thereby thwarting other countries from establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan and seriously constricting Taiwan’s international space.  With a population of 23 million crammed into a small island, Taiwan has one of the highest rates of population density in the world.  Separated only by a 180-kilometer Taiwan Strait, since the opening of cross-Straits economic interaction, at least one to two million Taiwanese citizens – accounting for at least five to nine percent of Taiwan’s population – travel to and from China for business, tourism, study, and other reasons annually.  Flights to and from major and secondary cities in China to Taiwan are common.  During the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus, Taiwan became a frontline state.

As if being in the frontline of the COVID-19 pandemic is not enough, due to China’s aggressive prosecution of its version of the one-China policy, Taiwan also lays claim to the only nation on earth not allowed to join and participate in the World Health Organization (WHO).  Exclusion from the WHO clearly places Taiwan at-risk in cases of fast-changing crisis events, e.g., SARS, MERS, COVID-19, as the speed of information-sharing and response coordination are key to success of preventing a serious outbreak.  As a frontline state, Taiwan’s exclusion from WHO clearly risk Taiwan’s public health security.  

Surprisingly (or not), Taiwan was able to beat the odds and kept the COVID-19 coronavirus at bay registering very low levels of infection and death rates.  One common refrain explaining this ‘success’ is that Taiwan has learned from the bitter lesson of the SARS health crisis in 2002-2003.  The underlying verses of this refrain are that statistics coming out of China require multiple verifications due to its questionable reliability and accuracy.  Yet another oft-cited ‘explanation’ is that Taiwan being a pariah state and a global ‘orphan,’ so to speak, needs to be tough and learn to ‘go it alone’ in order to survive.  These explanations may be credible from a single case study point of view but from a comparative perspective they suffer from failure to acknowledge that some (or all of these) factors are not unique to Taiwan.  More importantly, it neglects agency and the role of agents and actors, that is, the role of politics, government, and leaders in adroitly managing (or exploiting) the situation.

New Zealand is another stellar case ably keeping the virus offshore.  Led by a young female Prime Minister – Jacinda Ardern – New Zealand’s successful strategy in ‘eliminating’ community transmission of the COVID-19 virus is well documented and reported in major global news outlets.​[19]​  Like Taiwan, the New Zealand government acted swiftly by closing its borders to travelers from countries that had high infection rate, e.g., China and Iran, during the early stages of the pandemic.  Some observers point to New Zealand being an island state (like Taiwan) and its location far from the epicenter of the initial outbreak (unlike Taiwan) as allowing the country to ‘buy time’ to prepare for a proper response.  Still others point to its relatively small population that is spread out throughout the country providing a clear advantage to the high-density living conditions found in Taiwan and in many urban areas in Asia and other parts of the world.  Yet again, while these reasons may be informative in a one country case study, scrutinized from a comparative perspective and like the popular reasons cited for the Taiwan case, they neglect the role of agency and fail to acknowledge that these factors are not unique to New Zealand.

Though not exactly similarly situated, the evidence thus far is that both Taiwan and New Zealand have successfully managed their public health response and kept the coronavirus largely at bay with low community transmission and low death rates.  Interestingly, observers have noted that both countries have female political leaders at the helm.  In a New York Times article that appeared in May 15, 2020, Amanda Taub noted that countries with women leaders – such as Germany, Taiwan, and New Zealand – seem to be more successful in their public health response against the COVID-19 virus.​[20]​  The two democracies have female leaders that enjoy high levels of public support.  Both have strong inventory of political capital resulting from their adept handling of the Hong Kong democracy protest against China (in the case of Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen) and the March 2019 Christchurch terror shooting (in the case of New Zealand’s Jacinda Ardern).  Both are also island states (though I have noted the two states location vis-à-vis the epicenter earlier) that lead some observers to claim that this geographical advantage facilitates border control and thereby keeping the coronavirus offshore.​[21]​  

Still the above ‘similarities’ as plausible explanations to the success of both Taiwan and New Zealand necessarily turn a blind eye to key features in the ‘similarities.’  While both are democracies, Taiwan is a semi-presidential system with a dual-executive system and currently the Tsai administration’s party also holds a majority in the legislature.  New Zealand, on the other hand, is a Westminster parliamentary system but majority coalition cabinet government.  In Taiwan’s form of government, executive and legislative branches have separate origin and separate survival.  In the New Zealand case, as in most parliamentary systems, cabinet government and the legislature have fused origin and survival.    These important institutional differences are consequential with regards to the differences in the number of veto points and veto players that political leaders need to navigate through and around in order to steer a proposed legislation or policy to become the law of the land.   In other words, these ‘similarities’ fails to appreciate the role that political agency plays in the management of the public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic in these two countries.  Leadership’s role in the use of political persuasion and political communication within the different democratic institutional settings allowed these two governments to dodge the public health crisis that beset many other democratic countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.

Applying the most different system design to a comparison of Taiwan and New Zealand helps us clarify the key factors to their respective COVID-19 pandemic response.  In the next section, we focus on a brief discussion of dynamic interaction of how political leadership used the issue contraction strategy to control the narrative surrounding the pandemic response and how the government effectively used political communication to persuade its citizens to ‘buy-in’ to the government’s plan to fight the coronavirus.

An Etiology of the ‘Successful’ Response – the Taiwan and New Zealand Stories

	In an earlier section of this paper, I suggested that Baumgartner’s theory of issue expansion and issue contraction can help set the framework for us to have a better appreciation of the role of political leadership and political communication in the successful public health responses of Taiwan and New Zealand.  I proposed that political leadership’s able navigation of the pandemic issue allowed a preferred narrative and rhetoric to take root in society.  Specifically, I suggest that by narrowing the terms of the COVID-19 virus pandemic and designating it as a medical and public health issue, political leadership in both Taiwan and New Zealand was able to define the participants and arena – largely limited to technocrats, health and medical specialists – that shape the policy and strategy to tackle the pandemic.    


Virus outbreak and initial public health response

In December 2019 and mid-January 2020, as the Chinese city of Wuhan begins to report cases of unknown viral infection causing pneumonia-like symptoms amongst patients, Taiwan is in the midst of a presidential and legislative election as well as preparation for the Lunar New Year festivities.  As the incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive Party held on to control both the executive and legislative branches of government, Taiwan had already been keeping an eye on the brewing public health crisis in the industrial city of Wuhan, China.  As early as January 3, Premier Su Tseng-chang ordered the Ministry of Health and Welfare to implement disease prevention measures in response to reports of an outbreak in China.​[22]​ 

With the Lunar New Year holidays looming and the impending return to Taiwan of large throngs of returning citizens working in China, as early as January 17, Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control (CDC) has already issued a travel alert for Wuhan, China.  Four days after the CDC’s travel alert for China, Taiwan established the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) under the rubric of the National Health Command Center (NHCC) headed by the Minister of Health and Welfare.  The CECC was given the authority and tasks with coordinating across government departments and agencies and have the power to enlist additional personnel during crises and emergencies.​[23]​ Taiwan’s CECC, in effect, was given a huge remit to muster the capacity of the state to enforce and implement all plans.  Agencies cooperated through the CECC.   The following day on January 22, Taiwan reported its first coronavirus case and the next day (January 23), China announced a total lockdown for the city of Wuhan and followed later by the province of Hubei.

The CECC went to work immediately after its creation, within three days of its establishment it expanded border control measures to all travelers from China, Hong Kong, and Macau and imposed heavy fines for travelers making false declarations of good health and travel routes especially through Wuhan.​[24]​  From the early days of Taiwan’s pandemic response, it is evident that the Minister of Health and Welfare and the CECC are front and center of the government’s efforts providing briefings and updates and communicating to the public on government announcements.

For the most part, Taiwan’s political leadership – specifically President Tsai Ing-wen and Premier Su Tseng-chang – largely delegated the epidemic response and coordination to the CECC but consistently supported the public messaging about wearing of masks, social distancing, handwashing, and personal hygiene.  President Tsai Ing-wen’s Facebook video, for example, reminded citizens to wash their hands regularly and taking preventive measure when in public and reassure the people that the government is actively monitoring developments regarding the epidemic.​[25]​  While President Tsai delegated the domestic responses to the Premier, Minister of Health and Welfare, and the CECC, she instead took on the role as Taiwan’s ‘external face’ in the pandemic response.  With China imposing lockdown, President Tsai called for Beijing to provide and share critical information about the coronavirus as well as calling the world’s attention about Taiwan’s exclusion from the World Health Organization (WHO) and Taiwan’s willingness to help in combatting the pandemic.​[26]​ 

In the case of New Zealand, the outbreak in China came at an inopportune time, as the southern hemisphere summer months (November to February) are peak tourist travel period.  In the last decade, New Zealand has welcomed millions of overseas visitors to its shores.  By the end of December 2019, Statistics New Zealand reported that significant increase in visitor arrivals from the year before with 3.89 million people visiting New Zealand.​[27]​ Of these visitors, China accounted for a significant portion with 407,100 tourists by December 2019.​[28]​  New Zealand also hosts over 60,000 international students from secondary to tertiary levels that were preparing to attend the new academic year beginning in mid-February.​[29]​  Large numbers of students are from China, India, Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East.  Both international tourism and education contribute significantly to New Zealand’s economy.  

As China enters lockdown and as infections outside of China are being recorded, the risk to New Zealand is still considered low.  After all, New Zealand’s geographical distance from the epicenter of the coronavirus outbreak provided it some cushion and bought time to organize its response.  Despite this low risk assessment, by January 24 New Zealand’s Ministry of Health set up a team to monitor the situation and quickly began to monitor arrivals from China in New Zealand’s international airports as well as arrange for a special charter flight to bring home New Zealanders stranded in Wuhan.   Within four days of the WHO declaring the outbreak as a ‘public health emergency of international concern,’ New Zealand imposed travel and quarantine restrictions for foreign travelers that have traveled and transited in China.​[30]​   

New Zealand reported its first confirmed COVID-19 case in February 28 from a New Zealander returning home from Iran.​[31]​  This first announcement was reported by the Minister of Health and the Director-General of Health – Dr. Ashley Bloomfield.  Since this first confirmed case, the Ministry of Health in their daily press briefings are reporting increases in infection within the community and providing information about contact tracing and the clusters where the infections are occurring.  As the number of cases continued to rise in New Zealand, the government increasingly instituted stricter border controls and quarantine regulations on all arrivals with the Prime Minister sternly warning visitors who flout the quarantine rules with deportation from New Zealand.​[32]​  

By and large, New Zealand’s responses take notes of WHO advisory with adaptation to the domestic situation.  Similar to Taiwan’s actions at the onset of the virus outbreak, the New Zealand response saw the political leadership giving the public health experts – health care experts, medical professionals, and epidemiologists – as much leeway to advise, coordinate, and manage the public health response strategy.  From the press briefing reporting the first positive COVID-19 virus infection locally, the public face of the campaign against COVID-19 is Dr. Ashley Bloomfield (Director-General of Health) and other health experts with the Prime Minister and the Health Minister also present.  In these press briefings, health officials provide all information about current cases, the clusters and location of the transmission, and communicate the public about rules regarding social distancing, personal hygiene, and other health information guidelines.  

As the daily positive infection numbers gradually increase, by March 19 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced the closing of the country’s border to all, except its citizens.​[33]​  With the announcement that the country has recorded its 100th confirmed case of COVID-19 in the community on March 23, the Prime Minister announced that the whole country will go into at least a four-week lockdown beginning the midnight of March 25.  As the whole country prepared for lockdown and throughout what eventually became a five-week lockdown, the message from the Prime Minister and the cabinet was clear and consistent with the advice of Ministry of Health officials and public health experts.  Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in her press briefings reiterated that the whole country is in this battle together – the ‘team of five million’ as it came to be known – and ask New Zealanders to “Stay strong, be safe, and be kind.”  As the country emerged from the strict national lockdown, infection rates are very much under control and by June 8 there were no more active cases and the whole country went to the lowest level of alert allowing normal activities to resume without restrictions.

For Taiwan and New Zealand, there are variations in the approach to battle the pandemic with Taiwan not enforcing a national lockdown while New Zealand had a five-week lockdown.  Common between the two countries, though, is the early establishment of response and monitoring teams led by the health ministries, aggressive testing and contact-tracing, border controls, and quarantine procedures.  More importantly, the political leadership empowered the technocrats and public health specialists as well as supportive, uniform, and consistent communication of the public health issues and response to their citizens are shared experience of Taiwan and New Zealand.

Political leadership, issue contraction, and political communication

Not that the first two decades of the 21st century do not have their fair share of crisis of global scale – with the 9/11 terror attack, the subsequent wars from the terror attack on the United States, the 2007-2008 global financial meltdown – it is fair to claim that the COVID-19 pandemic is the biggest political, economic, and social challenge to face the world in the 21st century thus far.  In the face of these challenges, the role that political leadership plays can never be overemphasized.  Yet as Baumgartner reminds us, politicians and policymakers depending on their preferences and backgrounds will seek to steer policy debate to an arena that will provide the preferred policy with the greatest chances of being adopted and promulgated.   

For the political leaders of New Zealand and Taiwan, the challenge of the public health response is how to bring ‘everyone’ along to observe and abide by the guidelines for the elimination and control strategy to be effective.  It is a classic problem of collective action that requires full cooperation of the public as anything short of that is likely to doom the strategy to stamp out the virus.  In a recent keynote speech given by NZ Director-General of Health, Dr. Ashley Bloomfield, at the University of Canterbury, he reminded the audience that “leadership is an invitation to collective action.”​[34]​  Indeed, in modern democracies effective public policies, more often than not, require large group adherence or collective action to be effective.  For both Taiwan and New Zealand, political leadership’s first task is control of the issue definition and then followed-up by standardizing the strategy of political communication and messaging around the public health response.  Taiwan’s establishment of the CECC and New Zealand’s creation of a monitoring group of public health specialists and experts in the Ministry of Health are an evidence of how the political leadership defines the issue.  

In addressing the collective action problem at hand, the political leadership in both countries placed their attention in the control of issue definition and the management of the pandemic narrative.  In the March 23, 2020 government press conference, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern while announcing a nationwide lockdown to be in effect in 48-hours, quickly set the tone of how the government intends to define the public health challenge the country faces.​[35]​  In that press conference, the Prime Minister placed special mention as to how the rapid COVID-19 infection in Italy and Spain overwhelmed the public health systems of these two countries.  Comparatively speaking, New Zealand’s public health system has one of the lowest ventilators and intensive care unit beds (ICU) per 100,000 people amongst OECD countries and public health experts have warned that without a lockdown the healthcare system will be easily overwhelmed.​[36]​  Prime Minister Ardern stated that the government was keeping abreast of development of the COVID battle in other countries and that the government has adopted an ‘elimination’ strategy and to “go early, decisively, and go hard” otherwise the “health system will be inundated.”​[37]​ In New Zealand, political leadership decided early on that the issue at hand is primarily a public health, public safety, medical and epidemiological issue.  

As mentioned in the prior section, Taiwan’s experience in prior virus outbreak, e.g. SARS and MERS, facilitated the rapid mobilization of Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC).  The CECC was very effective in coordinating the various agencies to expand border control measures, establish quarantine and contact tracing procedures, entrust law enforcement agencies to implement and supervise quarantine.  This focus on science-informed public health response is evident in Taiwan with the political leadership giving way to the CECC as the public face of the COVID-19 battle.  An interesting dimension to Taiwan’s COVID-19 battle is the ongoing state of cross-Straits relations since President Tsai’s election in 2016 and how this was weave into the narrative of how the public health crisis is defined.  While the WHO has, by February 11, 2020, named the coronavirus COVID-19, the local language media in Taiwan as well as government agencies continue to refer to the coronavirus with obvious references to China such as the “Wuhan virus,” “Wuhan pneumonia,” and “China virus.”​[38]​   

Political leadership in both countries have decided to place its trust in a science-informed public health policy and balancing it with an eye on insulating the political economy as much as possible.​[39]​  In the early and initial press briefings, new health, medical, and epidemiological terms  – such as novel coronavirus, symptomatic and asymptomatic infection, infection rate, infection fatality rate, contact-tracing, self-quarantine, viral incubation period, transmission clusters – were introduced and increasingly used in the communication about the COVID-19 virus.  As Baumgartner reminds us that the “contractors use the most arcane and incomprehensible technical vocabulary possible so that non-experts cannot even understand the issues being discussed.”​[40]​ 

	The consequences of this technical definition of the issue, as hypothesized by Baumgartner, is a narrowing of the number of participants and the arena where the policy is discussed, debated, and formulated.​[41]​  In Taiwan, the policy discussion revolves around the key actors that comprise the CECC – Minister of Health and Welfare and his ministry, Taiwan’s CDC, Taiwan’s public health community in academia and government and reporting to the Premier as head of the Executive Yuan (cabinet).  In New Zealand, the Westminster-style parliamentary system places collective responsibility on the Prime Minister and cabinet but in the case of the pandemic response places the Ministry of Health and its Director-General as well as the public health community of experts in universities and government at the forefront of advising and formulating policy.  

Clearly, defining the issue in such technical terms has narrowed the number of participants to experts and technical specialists and limited the arena to the public health and epidemiological fields.  In so doing, political leadership’s successful issue contraction kept the focus as a public health, public safety, and medical issue and gave the government time and space to plot out the most acceptable strategy to combat the COVID-19 virus.  For both Taiwan and New Zealand, the strategy is all about ‘elimination’ of the COVID-19 virus domestically, stopping community transmission, and saving lives.  Interestingly, alternative narratives did not take root as opposition parties are generally in agreement and support the government’s measures.

	With the narrative and rhetoric established, the political leadership’s next task is communicating the strategy to the wider public and drumming up public support.  The public health campaigns in both countries utilized the arsenal of media – both traditional and new – as well as supporting public safety agencies to disseminate the guidelines and policies to combat against the COVID-19 virus.  In New Zealand, the government initiated the “Unite against COVID-19” campaign that published everything there is to know about the government’s guidelines.  Publications of government guidelines were available in print and digital versions as well as the many languages spoken in New Zealand households.  These guidelines give information about the different alert levels and their requirements, health and safety information, toll free phone number for COVID related queries.  The campaign included slogans such as ‘Stay Strong, Be Safe, Be Kind’ and ‘Stay Home, Save Lives’ that focused the public on the collective effort to ‘eliminate’ the COVID-19 coronavirus. 

Leading up to the March 25 national lockdown and throughout the five-week lockdown period, the New Zealand public became familiar with public health experts, infectious disease specialists, and epidemiologists educating them about the science of fighting a virus pandemic.  New Zealanders learned about the difference between symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission of the virus, learned about aerial transmission of the virus to convince them of the importance of social distancing, began to understand the concept of ‘flattening the curve,’ told to keep to their ‘bubbles,’ listened to debates by public health experts about efficacy of facemask, and learned new social norms and behavior when in public. 

During the five-week national lockdown, the Prime Minister and the Director-General of Health held daily national press briefings to provide COVID-19 updates.  A typical press briefing during the lockdown is about 45 minutes where the Director-General of Health gives technical reports about the current community transmission, the infection clusters, and the recovery situation.  The Prime Minister reports about the broad strategy and continue to drive home the ‘elimination’ strategy of the government.  In the April 27, 2020 press briefing, for example, the 45-minute press briefing was equally divided between the Prime Minister and the Director-General of Health.  In the briefing, both Prime Minister and Director-General of Health focused their updates on the public health issues and presenting the forecast of New Zealand’s infection and recovery rates.  In this particular press briefing, the Prime Minister also announced that as New Zealand moves out of the strict lockdown a week later, the Ministry of Health and the Director-General of Health will be the only officials to provide the daily COVID-19 press briefing updates.  Throughout the campaign against COVID-19, the government and the Prime Minister communicated their message in unison with the advice of the experts in public health and medicine and consistently keeping the focus on the public health strategy and guidelines while always reminding the ‘team of five million’ to ‘be safe and be kind.’​[42]​

	Taiwan avoided a nationwide lockdown but enforced strict guidelines on citizens and travelers to prevent the spread of COVID-19 on the island.  Due to its proximity to China and the large number of citizens returning from China, border controls, quarantine procedures, and contact-tracing procedures were established immediately following the creation of the CECC.  The public campaign reminded citizens to wear masks in public, to maintain personal hygiene by washing their hands often began in earnest via traditional media as well as the popular social media platforms (such as Facebook and LINE) in Taiwan.  The SARS epidemic outbreak in 2003 in the island and the lessons learned contributed to high degree of public compliance to the public health guidelines.   To ensure sufficient facemask supply in the country, the government by late-January placed a ban on export and shipping out of facemask from Taiwan in order to prevent hoarding and profiteering from reselling with high markup.​[43]​  

Playing to the strength of the ubiquity of mobile phones, a tech-savvy citizenry, and taking advantage of Taiwan’s excellent information and communications technology infrastructure, the government led by a former hacker turned Digital Affairs Minister, Audrey Tang, develop downloadable software applications to efficiently support the government’s public health strategy.​[44]​  Using the omnipresent cellphone towers in Taiwan and the apps downloaded on mobile phones and other handheld devices facilitated the policing of people under mandatory self-quarantine and effective contact tracing.​[45]​  The apps also serve as a platform to provide in-time information such as where to get facemask, and more critically it allows the government the ability to control misinformation.​[46]​  On January 15, 2020, Taiwan promulgated into law the  “Anti-Infiltration Act” that includes in its provisions prosecution for disinformation and acting as agents of foreign hostile forces.​[47]​  Combatting misinformation on social media and other sources is a key focus of Taiwan’s successful campaign against COVID-19 as the CECC and the Ministry of Justice led a crackdown on spread of rumors and profiteering.​[48]​  As mentioned in an earlier section, the continued use of “Wuhan virus” by the government and media also entwined the COVID-19 battle into cross-Strait conflict and not only narrowed the issue definition as well as silence partisan opposition but also sensitized citizens to be more aware of possible disinformation and misinformation.  The adroit use of social media app in a ‘humor over rumor’ strategy in conjunction with government agencies’ prosecution of misinformation and profiteering allowed the government to focus the narrative on its public health strategy in combatting COVID-19. 

	In addressing the collective action problem in the campaign against COVID-19, the political leadership of New Zealand and Taiwan utilized an issue contraction strategy that allowed them to manage the narrative and rhetoric regarding the public health crisis and government response.  Effective management of the narrative allowed the political leadership to then implement a uniform political communication strategy that featured consistent messaging and information dissemination to its citizenry.  A notable example of the acceptance or acquiescence of the government narrative and position is public discussion about the efficacy of facemasks.  In Taiwan, experience of prior viral outbreaks, such as SARS in 2002-2003, have made facemask common and very much a part of person’s ‘wardrobe’ in public.  In New Zealand, informed by WHO advisory, the discussions about facemask are mainly conducted by public health experts regarding the efficacy of facemasks.  





At the time of this writing, after 103 days of no community infection since the lifting of the lockdown, New Zealand has had a resurgence of COVID-19 virus infection in the community in mid-August.  The resurgence was identified as concentrated in a small group in south Auckland.   On August 12, 2020, the government announced that Auckland enters level 3 lockdown while the rest of the country will be at level 2 alert levels.​[53]​  Auckland since September 1 is in level 2 alert like the rest of the country as the number of new infections has stabilized and the number of active cases declines.  Deflating as the news of the resurgence of new community infection is for the ‘team of five million’ New Zealanders, public opinion poll taken at this time shows that 75 percent of New Zealanders approving of the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.​[54]​  Throughout the ‘Unite against COVID-19’ campaign in New Zealand, public approval rating of the government’s handling of the health crisis has remained very high (between 75 to 86 percent).​[55]​

	As New Zealand was celebrating 103 days of no community infections in mid-August, Taiwan’s success is even more evident.  Taiwan has not reported a domestic infection of COVID-19 since the first week of April 2020 and all cases of infections being from travelers entering Taiwan.  As of early September 2020, Taiwan’s confirmed cases remained low (489 cases) and deaths even lower (7 cases).  The government’s adept handling of the public health crisis has gained public support with President Tsai’s approval rating at 68 percent and Premier Su’s approval rating at 65 percent.​[56]​ 
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